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"AND THEN THERE WERE NONE": THE
FATE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN
NEW YORK
HERALD PRICE FAHRINGER*
Agatha Christie, in her chilling mystery novel And Then There
Were None,' used the poem "Ten Little Indians" metaphorically to
characterize the murder of a small group of people one by one.2 In
New York, a defendant, in most felony trials, has at least ten per-
emptory challenges. 3 But soon there may be none.
One of the most serious threats to the integrity of the jury sys-
tem in New York, as well as in other places of the country, is the
movement afoot to reduce the number of peremptory challenges
afforded a defendant in criminal cases.4 A task force created by
Chief Judge Judith Kaye, of the New York Court of Appeals, to
investigate ways of improving jury selection has recommended,
among other things, that the number of peremptory challenges in
* Senior Partner, Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Salisbury & Cambria, Buffalo, New
York and New York, New York; B.A., Pennsylvania State University; MA., Pennsylvania
State University; J.D., University of Buffalo Law School. Mr. Fahringer is a criminal de-
fense lawyer practicing in New York City and specializing in the defense of white collar
criminal cases. Mr. Fahringer was the recipient of the Thurgood Marshall Award presented
by the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for outstanding contribu-
tion to Criminal Law in 1995.
1 AGATHA CmRusT, AND THEN THERE WERE NONE (1940).
2 Id.
3 N.Y. CaLm. PRoc. LAw § 270.25(2) (McKinney 1993).
Each party must be allowed the following number of peremptory challenges: (a)
Twenty for the regular jurors if the highest crime charged is a class A felony, and two
for each alternate juror to be selected; (b) Fifteen for the regular jurors if the highest
crime charged is a class B or class C felony, and two for each alternate juror to be
selected; (c) Ten for the regular jurors in all other cases, and two for each alternate
juror to be selected.
Id.
4 See Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge is no Longer Peremptory: Bat-
son's Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43
DEPAuL L. REv. 625, 641 (1994) (arguing that repeated use of peremptory challenges for
discriminatory purposes warrants their elimination); Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching
the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 568-69
(1992) (advocating elimination of peremptory challenges since Supreme Court has been
unable to remove discriminatory intent from their use).
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criminal cases be reduced. 5 On October 24, 1994, the Chief Judge
proposed that the New York State Legislature adopt the task
force's recommendation.
I. HARROWING IMPLICATIONS
The proposal to reduce peremptory challenges in criminal cases
is harrowing in its implications. Such a suggestion calls radically
into question our deepest assumptions concerning an accused's
meaningful right to an impartial jury trial.6 Any coherent exami-
nation of this issue requires a brief review of some basic constitu-
tional principles that form the backdrop for this discussion. The
Sixth Amendment7 guarantees to all persons accused of a crime
the right to a trial by an impartial jury." The principal way impar-
tiality is achieved is through a system of challenges exercised dur-
ing voir dire. A challenge may be asserted either for cause or
peremptorily.
A juror may be removed for cause if the trial judge is satisfied
that he or she "has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him
[or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based on the evidence
adduced at the trial."9 No specific reason need be assigned for a
peremptory challenge.1 0 The court must excuse a person so chal-
lenged. On the other hand, the peremptory challenge "allow[s]
[the] parties to exclude a given number of persons who otherwise
would satisfy the requirements for service on the petit jury."'1 To
ensure that a jury is purged of suspected prejudices, a full comple-
ment of peremptory challenges is essential.
5 THE JURY PROJECT, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Mar. 31,
1994, at 67. The committee recommended that peremptory challenges be reduced in class A
felonies from 20 to 15; in class B and C felonies from 15 to 10; and in class D and E felonies
from 10 to 7. Id. The committee also recommended that the number of peremptory chal-
lenges in civil trials be reduced as well. Id.
6 See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 418 (1894) (noting that peremptory chal-
lenges are "one of the most important rights secured to the accused").
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "[In all crim-
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an im-
partial jury of the state and district, wherein the crime shall have been committed .... "
8 See Michael J. Desmond, Note, Limiting a Defendant's Peremptory Challenges: Georgia
v. McCollum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 389,
389-90 (1993) (discussing importance of jury system to ensure fair trial).
9 See N.Y. CIm. PRoc. LAw § 270.20(1)(b) (McKinney 1993).
10 Id. § 270.25(1). "A peremptory challenge is an objection to a prospective juror for
which no reason need be assigned. Upon any peremptory challenge, the court must exclude
the person challenged from service." Id.
11 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
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II. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE'S ANCIENT LINEAGE
The peremptory challenge is of ancient lineage, stretching back
over 200 years of English common law and even into Roman
times. 2 The use of peremptory challenges in this country dates as
far back as the founding of the Republic-and its common-law ori-
gins go back even farther. 13 Although no constitutional right to a
peremptory challenge exists, it has always been a widely held be-
lief that it is an essential part of a trial by jury. In other words,
the right of an unqualified challenge is needed to help insure that
the jury selected is free from bias and prejudice.
More than two centuries ago, Blackstone eloquently described
the virtues of the peremptory challenge:
[The peremptory challenge is a] provision full of that tender-
ness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws
are justly famous. This is grounded on two reasons. As
everyone must be sensible, what sudden impressions and un-
accountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare
looks and gestures of another; and how necessary it is, that a
prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a good opin-
ion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him;
the law wills not that he shall be tried by any one man
against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without be-
ing able to assign a reason for such his dislike.' 4
Every trial lawyer knows that the exercise of a peremptory chal-
lenge is often without logic and is usually based on feelings and
instincts. Ours is a human system, and there are signs and symp-
toms that a lawyer can see in jurors that cannot, and perhaps
should not, be articulated. These indicators tell us that a particu-
lar individual may not be right for a given case. For example,
there are otherwise qualified jurors whose life experience, by vir-
tue of their age, intellect, or other circumstances, places them in a
poor position to analyze a sophisticated defense or prosecution
theory. The only way such a juror can be removed from the jury is
peremptorily.
12 See J. PE rrnGAL, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE USE AND PRACTICE OF JURIES AMONG THE
GREEKS AND RoMANs 115, 135 (1769) (discussing ancient history of peremptory challenges).
13 See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481 (1990).
14 4 WmLi m BLACKS'TONE, ComasmNTAR-Es 353 (15th ed. 1809).
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III. JURORS TODAY ARE OVERBURDENED WITH PREJUDICES
What must be taken into account, when discussing peremptory
challenges, is the alarming increase in prejudices that pose a con-
stant threat to the integrity of jury verdicts. The disruptive forces
of unemployment, overcrowding, growing economic inequality,
and meaningless violence have combined to polarize our society.
It seems that hate, not hope, springs eternal in our new world.
And when hatred establishes itself as habit, it passes beyond the
power of reason to understand it, or words to explain it. Today,
this species of prejudice is chronic. Simply put, as times grow
worse, prejudices deepen. And sadly, some of these prejudices
have gained a high gloss of plausibility.
Moreover, as crime in major cities becomes more rampant and
ruthless, fear is slowly paralyzing the public. There are people in
New York City who walk with death every day. Jurors caught in
the grip of these forces, and held hostage to these fears, are filing
into our courts overburdened with prejudices that can easily
wreck a criminal trial if not attended to. Because challenges for
cause are incapable of effectively dealing with this serious prob-
lem facing litigants, the only practical instrument available to re-
move these corrosive prejudices from jury panels is the peremp-
tory strike.
IV. "AND MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT: THERE REALLY IS NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PEREMPTORY."
In his dissent in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,15 Justice Scalia
declared: "And make no mistake about it: there really is no substi-
tute for the peremptory."16 Challenges for cause will not solve the
problem of jury prejudice because most jurors are reluctant to ac-
knowledge their biases. No matter how hard lawyers try to un-
cover prejudice, many jurors will disavow it. Research in social
psychology has established that the behavior and attitudes of ju-
rors are influenced by the ceremonial flavor of the selection pro-
cess.17 Under the circumstances of uncertainty and unfamiliarity
that exists in a courtroom, jurors become very sensitive to "social
15 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1438 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16 See id. at 1439.
17 See, e.g., W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENTpassim (1968); T. Sarbin, Contex-
tualism: A World View for Modern Psychology, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATIONS
16-17 (J. Cole, ed. 1976) (focusing on social scientists' theory of role enactment).
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comparison information," i.e., signs from other people around
them indicating the appropriateness of their behavior, attitudes,
and feelings. 8
Thus, during voir dire, jurors may attempt to answer in what
they think is a socially appropriate manner instead of being hon-
est.19 Opinions expressed in public often differ from opinions ex-
pressed in private.20 Even the most conscientious juror's ability to
candidly express their feelings, particularly on sensitive or contro-
versial issues, is inhibited by a need to appear acceptable to other
jurors.2' As the "right" or socially correct responses become clear
during voir dire, answers from jurors become less and less relia-
ble.22 In a word, jurors quickly learn the paraphernalia of pre-
tense and become shamelessly eager to please.23
Experienced trial lawyers, using their well-honed senses, can
often detect this lack of candor and recognize deep-seated
prejudices that remain unspoken.2 4 Seasoned attorneys can sense
an undertone of hostility in expressions and movements that are
illegible to others. Without the power of a peremptory challenge,
these antagonisms will remain on the jury and may ultimately
taint the verdict.
Furthermore, on the few occasions when biases are unmasked
during the voir dire, disarming or defusing them lies beyond the
appliances of our profession. Often jurors will understandably try
to convince the court and counsel that their prejudices can be set
aside.25 Pledges of fairness in the courtroom are alluring but unre-
18 See generally STANLEY SCHACTER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AFFILIATION passim (1959);
Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 Hum. REL. 117 passim (1954).
19 See John L. Carroll, Speaking the Truth: Voir Dire in the Capitol Case, 3 AM. J. TRuAL
AnVoc. 199, 200 (1979). "[Jurors] refuse to reveal their own prejudice either because they
are unaware that it exists or because the verbal acknowledgment of their prejudice would
be embarrassing or socially unacceptable." Id.
20 See PAUL A. HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMA.L GROUP RESEARCH 35 (1962). As a general
matter, those opinions expressed in public, or with the known possibility of being made
public, are more conforming to the majority or prevalent opinion. Id.
21 See Neal Bush, The Case for Expansive Voir Dire, 2 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 9, 19-20
(1976) (suggesting that private voir dire is more appropriate than group voir dire in certain
instances to prevent jurors from consciously fabricating "acceptable" answers).
22 Id. at 11, 13-14 (noting that jurors will either give affirmative answer or will lie when
asked about possible prejudices).
23 Id. at 13 (asserting that some jurors will manipulate their answers to remain on jury
panel).
24 Id. at 17 (stating that voir dire is most effective in obtaining impartial jury when
attorneys from both sides are allowed to question potential jurors).
25 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1960); United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 1203,
1209 (5th Cir. 1975). Assurances of impartiality from prospective jurors, despite known and
unknown prejudices, are best met with healthy skepticism. Id.; James J. Gobert, Criminal
1995]
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liable. 26 Such assurances are inherently suspect. 27 The plain fact
is that today most of the profound prejudices that afflict many ju-
rors are incorrigible. 28 The only effective way to dispose of them is
through the use of a peremptory challenge.
On the rare occasion when prejudice is uncovered by counsel,
the trial judge has the authority to remove the juror for cause.2 s
Although many believe that trial judges should lean toward dis-
qualifying jurors of dubious impartiality rather than testing the
bounds of their discretion by permitting such a questionable juror
to serve, it does not always work that way.30 In most cases, suc-
cessful challenges for cause are rare because few jurors are so
plainly prejudiced that judges feel obliged to exclude them.
Moreover, invoking the court's authority to excuse a juror for
cause involves an exercise of discretion that is rarely overruled.3
If the juror in question convinces the court that he or she can be
fair, the challenge is rejected. But such a judgment involves an
evaluation of the juror's credibility. Since the judge is no better
Law: In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRns. L. & CRniNOLOGY, 269, 307 (1988) (not-
ing difficulty of determining whether juror's preexisting knowledge will effect his interpre-
tation of case).
26 See Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723 (vacating death sentence as notoriety of defendant's crime
in community prevented selection of impartial jury); Williams, 523 F.2d at 1209 (reversing
and remanding conviction because pretrial publicity and closing argument prevented fair
trial).
27 See Dowd, 366 U.S. at 725 (noting that pretrial publicity can make it impossible for
juror to render unprejudiced decision); Williams, 523 F.2d at 1209 (same).
28 See generally Gobert, supra note 25, at 309 n.178 (suggesting that once formed, im-
pressions or beliefs are extremely difficult to challenge, even when individuals are con-
fronted with objective facts that tend to refute them).
29 People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 110, 305 N.E.2d 469, 482, 350 N.Y.S.2d 381, 400
(1973) (holding reversible error for failure by court to remove jurors for cause after prejudi-
cial biases were revealed, thus causing defense attorney to exhaust all peremptory chal-
lenges for their removal).
30 Id. at 108, 305 N.E.2d at 480, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 398. The court stated:
It is almost always wise for a trial court to err on the side of disqualification.... Even
if a juror is wrongly but not arbitrarily excused, the worst the court will have done in
most cases is to have replaced one impartial juror with another impartial juror.
Id. Despite this clear admonition, most trial judges are far too miserly in granting chal-
lenges for cause.
31 See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1250 (1988). The Court
held that the defendant's right to an impartial jury was not violated when he was required
to use a peremptory challenge to excuse a juror who clearly should have been excused for
cause. Ross, 487 U.S. at 88. The Court concluded that an improper denial of a challenge for
cause is not error requiring a reversal of the conviction unless the defendant can show that
the jurors who actually sat on his case were not impartial. Id. at 89. Thus, this brand of
error, which in the past had always called for an automatic reversal, has now been rele-
gated to the harmless error rule. Id. at 91.
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equipped to detect dishonesty than the trial lawyer,32 the peremp-
tory challenge provides the only means of ridding the jury of a
person whom counsel intuitively knows is biased.
33
In the real world of selecting jurors, there is yet another more
subtle reason why the peremptory challenge is very important. It
is one that Blackstone astutely observed:
Because, upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason as-
signed proves insufficient to set aside the juror, perhaps the
bare questioning of his indifference may sometimes provoke a
resentment; to prevent all ill consequences from which, the
prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set
him aside.3 4
If a challenge for cause should fail, a peremptory challenge is
needed to remove the juror who, in all probability, has come to
resent the examining attorney.
V. ACCELERATED JURY SELECTION HAS INCREASED THE NEED
FOR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The need for an ample allotment of peremptory challenges is
reinforced by an alarming trend in New York of accelerating the
process of jury selection.35 Many judges view voir dire as a central
drain of the court's time, and have launched a movement to se-
verely restrict it. 36 Indeed, across the state, trial judges are impos-
ing harsh limits on the amount of time permitted for voir dire.
The practice of accelerating jury selection was recently ap-
proved in People v. Jean, 7 where defense counsel was limited to
fifteen minutes on his voir dire in the first two rounds and ten
minutes in the third round .3  As a result of these severe con-
straints, counsel was unable to question many of the prospective
32 See N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAw § 270.15(1)(c) (McKinney 1993) (permitting both parties
and court to examine prospective jurors).
33 See V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATTORNEY's GUME TO
JuRY LAw AND METHODS § 10.4.3 (1985) (explaining that peremptory challenge permits at-
torney to dismiss jurors whom he believes to fit common stereotype, without making state-
ment as to why dismissal should occur).
34 See BLAcKsToNE, supra note 14, at 353.
35 See People v. Pepper, 59 N.Y.2d 353, 358-59, 452 N.E.2d 1178, 1180, 465 N.Y.S.2d
850, 852 (1983) (noting that trial court has broad discretion to prevent voir dire from being
unduly protracted).
36 Id.
37 75 N.Y.2d 744, 551 N.E.2d 90, 551 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1990).
38 Id. at 745, 551 N.E.2d at 91, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
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jurors individually, but instead was forced to address the panel as
a group. 39 Nevertheless, the conviction was affirmed. 40 Trial
judges throughout New York, armed with the Jean case, are im-
posing formidable time limits on jury selection.41
Those who go to trial today, in the pervasive climate of law and
order sweeping this country, face the risk of conviction, even when
innocent. Consequently, now more than ever, it is imperative that
sufficient care be taken in choosing those who will judge an ac-
cused in this hostile environment. The hurried selection of jurors
that some defendants must endure today represents an indefen-
sible departure from the constitutional safeguards established
long ago to insure that an accused receives a fair trial.42
An even more disconcerting consequence of this rushing of jury
selection is the impact that it has on the exercise of challenges.
Identifying prejudices that might give rise to a challenge for cause
requires an in-depth and searching inquiry, performed by attor-
neys who are sensitive to the peculiar biases that will affect their
case. 43 This task takes more time than is being afforded lawyers
today. With less time to examine jurors, and thus less time to
build a factual record for a challenge for cause, lawyers are re-
quired to rely more and more on instinctive judgments. In other
words, as the range of information that may be discovered about a
prospective juror is reduced, the need for peremptory challenges
increases. This important factor fortifies the need for a full quota




41 See, e.g., People v. Rampersant, 182 A.D.2d 373, 374, 581 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (1st Dep't
1992) (allowing court discretion to set time constraints on voir dire); People v. Lawrence,
159 A.D.2d 518, 518, 552 N.Y.S.2d 385, 386 (2d Dep't 1990) (holding that court did not
commit error by fixing time limits on attorneys during voir dire).
42 See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981). The court recognized the
importance of voir dire in stating that: "voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the
criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored."
Id.
43 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994). The Court held that:
"voir dire provides an essential means of discovering actual or implied bias and a founda-
tion upon which the parties may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently." Id.;
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating
that voir dire "facilitate[s] intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges and . . . [helps]
uncover factors that would dictate disqualification for cause"); see also United States v.
Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494, 1497 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that "without an adequate foundation
[laid by voir dire], counsel cannot exercise sensitive and intelligent peremptory
challenges").
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VI. THE BATSON ISSUE DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES BE EITHER ELIMINATED OR REDUCED
Nothing stated here is incompatible with the view that peremp-
tory challenges cannot be used to strike jurors based solely on
their race or gender. The Supreme Court's recent inoculation of
peremptory challenges against their use in a racially discrimina-
tory manner does not argue for their reduction." In the wake of
Batson,45 some people have come to believe that the peremptory
challenge's inherent potential for corrupting the selection process
by excluding jurors on racially motivated grounds calls for its
elimination entirely.46
This would be a terrible mistake. An institution with such a
long and venerable history should not be depreciated merely be-
cause a few lawyers have misused peremptory challenges in a dis-
criminatory manner-any more than a lawyer's misuse of cross-
examination would be cause for its elimination. 47
Research shows that Batson issues arise in less than five per-
cent of the cases litigated throughout all of New York State.48 In
the other ninety-five percent of cases tried, the orthodox exercise
44 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
45 Id. at 89 (holding that discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutor
against members of defendant's racial class violated Equal Protection Clause); J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994) (holding intentional discrimination on
basis of gender in peremptory challenges violates Equal Protection Clause); Edmondson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (extending Batson to civil cases); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding white defendant has standing to assert right of
black jurors not to be removed from jury for racial grounds).
46 Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring). The late Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall urged the elimination of peremptory challenges because the potential for their illegiti-
mate use taints the process of jury selection. Id.; see also Morehead, supra note 4, at 625
(arguing that even after Batson, peremptory challenges can still be used to exclude minori-
ties from juries). Two judges on the New York Court of Appeals, in a concurring opinion,
have embraced Justice Marshall's contention and have recommended that the New York
Legislature reexamine the curriculum of peremptory challenges with the view toward elim-
inating them. See generally People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 328, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1141,
582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 957 (1992).
47 See Bray, supra note 4, at 521-22 (describing development of peremptory challenges in
English common law); BLAcKsToNE, supra note 14, at 352-53 (describing why peremptory
challenges are required to reach just results in criminal cases).
48 See NEW YORK CoUNCmc OF CamnnAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, COMMITTEE FOR THE PRESER-
VATION OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 12-13 (June 27, 1994). An investigation of the pending
briefs in the New York County District Attorney's office revealed that of the more than
1600 briefs prepared in 1992 and 1993, there were only 32 cases involving Batson claims
which results in a calculation of roughly 1% each year or 2% of all the cases appealed. Id. In
1993, there were 4,137 cases tried to a conclusion in the Supreme Court of New York. Id. In
appeals from the resulting convictions, only 29 cases, or .07% raised Batson issues. Id. Of
course, a number of variables are contained in this difficult statistical analysis. But these
numbers are certainly some indication of the scarcity of litigated Batson claims. Id.
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of peremptory challenges provides a valuable and legitimate
means of minimizing prejudice on jury panels. One set of com-
mentators has observed that in the vast majority of cases, the
question of improperly exercised peremptories does not even arise,
and accordingly, there is no extra litigative cost.49 When Batson
issues do arise, most claims are immediately dismissed by the
judge because the defense has failed to establish a prima facie ba-
sis for believing that any improper challenge has been exercised.5"
Some authors suggest that, typically "Batson hearings are a 5-to-
15-minute interlude during the jury selection process."51 On the
rare occasion when a peremptory challenge is abused, it can be
remedied by invoking the corrective measures so carefully calcu-
lated in Batson.
To cast out the peremptory challenge with the bathwater of
such a small circle of cases would be an awful miscalculation. It
would be unthinkable to reduce the number of peremptory chal-
lenges to counteract a situation that might arise in less than five
percent of the cases tried in New York. Moreover, it appears that
the Batson doctrine has crested and will not expand beyond race
and gender.52
VII. THE REDUCTION OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES WILL HARM
DEFENDANTS MUCH MORE THAN THE PROSECUTION
The reduction of peremptory challenges will harm the defense
far more than the prosecution because the defendant in a criminal
case has a greater need for peremptory challenges than the state.
It is generally acknowledged that the prosecution in most criminal
49 Alynna Helland et al., An Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Peremptories: A
Rebuttal, 29 Camn. L. BULL. 242 passim (1992).
50 See David D. Hopper, Note, Batson v. Kentucky And the Prosecutorial Peremptory
Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REv. 811,821 (1988) (not-
ing that many courts have not found prima facie cases when prosecutors removed several
blacks from juries, but could have removed more); Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batsons's Invidi-
ous Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 336, 357-58 (1993). Since Batson, prime facie cases of discriminatory per-
emptory challenges have been established in only seventy-six federal circuit cases. Id. In
only three of those cases did the courts find that the attorney's race-neutral reasons forjuror exclusion were pretextual, therefore requiring reversal under Batson. Id.
51 See Helland et al., supra note 49, at 242.
52 See Davis v. Minnesota, 50 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120
(1994). On May 23, 1994, the Supreme Court declined to hear a case which presented the
issue of whether Batson should be extended to religious bias Id.
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cases has a decided advantage over the defendant.53 Studies have
shown that a preponderance of jurors come to court bearing beliefs
that are more antagonistic to the defendant than to the state. 4 A
number of states have acknowledged this disparity of prejudice by
allowing a larger ration of peremptory challenges for the defense
than for the prosecution. 5
Years ago the National Jury Project, an organization that con-
ducted some of the most authoritative research in the field of jury
dynamics, found that two-thirds of the jurors were unsympathetic
to the defendant. 56 Their studies showed that thirty-one percent of
the people selected for jury duty believe that an accused person is
guilty simply because a charge has been made. 57 In addition, more
than fifty percent believe that it is the defendant's responsibility
to prove his or her innocence rather than the state's burden to
prove the case.58
We must assume that the public's deep skepticism regarding a
defendant's rights has reached an even higher level today.59 As a
consequence, a much greater burden rests upon the defense, than
upon the prosecution, to remove biased jurors. Any reduction in
the number of peremptory challenges will slight the defense far
more than the prosecution and will inevitably lead to an imbal-
ance of prejudice on the jury. However, and most significantly,
the District Attorney's Association of New York also opposes the
reduction of peremptory challenges in criminal cases.6 ° Certainly,
53 See, e.g., Jay S. Silver, Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A new Constitu-
tional Right, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (noting that Rehnquist Court lacked faith in
process by which criminal charges are adjudicated).
54 See, e.g., What Empirical Research Tells Us, and What We Need to Know About Juries
and the Quest For Impartiality, 40 Am. U. L. REv. 547 passim (1991) (discussing potential
jurors' beliefs that defendants are guilty).
55 See JON M. VAN DYxE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDUREs 282-83 (1977). Significantly, the
defendant is given more peremptory challenges than the prosecutor in eleven states. States
that allow more challenges to the defendant than the prosecution are: Alaska, Arkansas,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, and West Virginia. Id. See also FED. R. CRim. P. 24. Under rule 24, a defendant is given
10 peremptory challenges to the Government's six. Id.
56 See NATIONAL JuRY PROJECT, INC., JURYWORIC SYsTEmAsTIC TECHNIQUES § 2.04[2][a]
n.16 [hereinafter NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, INC.] (Elissa Kauss & Beth Bonora eds., 2d ed.
1994); see also NATIONAL JURY PROJECT AND NATIONAL LAwYERs GuILD, THE JURY SYSTEM 2
(1975) (finding 60% of prospective jurors unable to follow court instructions that defendant
is presumed innocent and prosecution has burden of proof).
57 See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, INC., supra note 56, § 2.0412][a] n.16.
58 Id. § 2.04 [2] aJ n.15.
59 Id.
60 See Gary Spencer, Proposals on Jury System Elicit Unease in the Courts, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 11, 1994, at 2.
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this position, coming as it does from such a formidable group,
lends force to the arguments presented here and indicates that
they are bipartisan.
Finally, those who advocate reducing the number of peremptory
challenges argue that it will save costs and expedite trials. 1 Dur-
ing times inhospitable to delay, public officials, in an attempt to
modernize, are constantly negotiating the tensions that exist be-
tween time consuming procedural safeguards and ways to more
efficiently administer justice. Admittedly, the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges does delay the selection process somewhat and
calls more jurors into service.62 Nevertheless, such a small cost
and modest delay must be endured if impartial juries are to be
secured. Jury selection is one of the most important aspects of
any criminal trial. This critical safeguard should not be sacrificed
for a small measure of judicial economy.
CONCLUSION
A fair determination of an individual's guilt or innocence is one
of the most cherished policies of our civilization. 3 The right to a
trial by jury has occupied a central place in our system of justice
because it safeguards the accused from arbitrary exercises of
power by the government. To successfully fulfill this important
constitutional objective, a jury must, of necessity, be impartial.
Thus, the traditional means of minimizing prejudice through the
peremptory challenge must be left intact. It is as simple as that.
Such an important safeguard should not be sacrificed for mere ex-
pediency. Without an adequate accompaniment of peremptory
challenges, fair trials in this state-and indeed throughout the
country-will be seriously jeopardized.
61 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 153, 157 (1989). "[Iln the
United States, the process of selecting a jury is often prolonged, sometimes consuming as
much time as the trial." Id.
62 Id. at 155.
63 See 3 WLLAM BLcKsToNE, COm rNTARIES § 379 (Cooley ed., 1899) (describing trial
by jury as "the glory of the english law").
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